Investment Bank Expertise in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by Arena, Matteo & Dewally, Michael
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Finance Faculty Research and Publications Finance, Department of
3-20-2017






Accepted version. Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 2017): 81-112. DOI. © 2017
The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association. Used with
permission.
 Marquette University 
e-Publications@Marquette 
 
Finance Faculty Research and Publications/College of Business 
Administration 
 
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The 
published version may be accessed by following the link in the citation below. 
 
Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 20, 2017): 81-112. DOI. This article is © Wiley and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the 
express permission from Wiley.  
INVESTMENT BANK EXPERTISE IN CROSS-
BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 






We study the influence of country expertise of investment banks in facilitating cross‐border merger deals by 
analyzing a large international sample of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals. We provide evidence that the 
geographical proximity, cultural affinity, and local experience of investment banks advising bidding firms on 
cross‐border M&A deals significantly increase the probability of completion of the deal, significantly decrease 
the time required to complete the deal, and significantly increase the operating performance of the acquiring 
firm after the deal. Our results are robust to firm, deal, country‐specific factors, and endogeneity concerns. 
I. Introduction 
The fast-evolving literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has recently begun exploring the pivotal role of 
investment banks in facilitating M&A transactions. Although older studies, such as Servaes and Zenner (1996), 
do not find any significant effect of investment banks on the success of M&As, more recent studies present 
evidence that suggests that investment banks play an important part in M&A deals and contribute to their 
performance (e.g., Bao and Edmans 2011; Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012; Sibilkov and McConnell 2014). 
However, despite the fact that almost half of M&As are cross-border deals (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012), all 
the studies that examine the influence of investment banks on M&As focus on domestic acquisitions where the 
bidding firm and the acquisition target are headquartered in the same country. We examine a large 
international sample of cross-border mergers and show that the expertise of the acquirer-side investment bank 
in the country of the acquisition target has a significant effect on the outcome of the deal. Specifically, for the 
first time in the literature we investigate the effect of the advising bank’s target country expertise on the 
probability of completing cross-border M&A deals, the time required to successfully complete a deal, the stock 
market reaction to the deal announcement, and the postmerger performance of the acquiring firm. 
 
Cross-country M&As are particularly challenging because of the obstacles caused by the geographical distance 
and cultural differences between the countries of the two merging firms (Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh 1996; 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015). Consequently, acquirer firms might strategically select their advisors to 
ensure a successful outcome for the deal. The prior literature on the role of investment banks in the market for 
corporate control limited its focus on domestic deals to ask whether larger or more reputable investment banks 
provide a superior intermediation experience in line with the higher fees they collect. However, at the 
international level the direct experience and knowledge about the target country by the hired investment bank 
is likely to be more valuable to the acquirer than is generic deal experience. 
 
In this article, for the first time we move past this general domestic measure of bank prestige to investigate 
what specific bank expertise components are important in a more complex network of international cross-
border deals where deal completion and success requires navigating long distances and diverse cultures. We 
also provide an important contribution to the fast-expanding literature of the importance of geography and 
cultural values in financial transactions. Although several studies examine the importance of geographical 
distances and cultural differences in loan contracting, financing costs, payout policy, and other financial policies 
and transactions (e.g., Giannetti and Yafeh 2012; Arena and Dewally 2012; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva 2011; 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015), we are the first to show the importance of these dimensions in relation to 
the advising role of investment banks in M&A transactions. 
 
Investment bank expertise in the country of the acquisition target of a cross-border merger is particularly 
important for two reasons. First, language and cultural differences increase the contracting costs of a cross-
border merger (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015). These barriers during contractual negotiations can be 
partially overcome if the investment bank is headquartered in a country that is geographically or culturally close 
to the country of the acquisition target or if the bank has accumulated experience through past deals in the 
target country. To wit, in its 1999 “Unlocking Shareholder Value: The Keys to Success” report, KPMG finds that 
deals between U.S. and continental European firms are 11% less likely to be successful than deals between U.S. 
and U.K. firms despite extensive deal experience. The study cites greater cultural differences and challenges as 
responsible for the difference. 
 
Second, cross-border mergers often take advantage of misvaluations due to temporary currency depreciations 
(Baker, Foley, and Wurgler 2009). These arbitrage opportunities might be better identified by an investment 
bank with expertise in that country rather than by the nonfinancial bidding firm or an investment bank with 
large global experience but no target country expertise. 
 
The sample comprises all cross-border M&As initiated by publicly traded firms targeting publicly traded or 
private firms between 1994 and 2012 for which information about the bidder-advising investment bank is 
available. Our sample consists of 7,630 M&A deals for target firms headquartered in 127 countries from 4,072 
unique acquiring firms headquartered in 70 countries advised by 1,093 unique investment banks headquartered 
in 53 countries. We conduct the multivariate analysis by estimating several fixed effect regressions with 
measures of the success of the deal as dependent variables. The main independent variables of the study are 
proxies for country expertise of the investment bank that advises the acquiring firm. The three proxies are (1) 
the distance between the capital of the investment bank headquarters’ country and the capital of the target 
headquarters’ country (IB Geographical Distance), (2) the cultural distance between the investment bank and 
target countries (IB Cultural Distance), and (3) the previous experience accumulated by the investment bank in 
the target country measured as the number of deals completed by the investment bank in that country in the 
previous five years (IB Deal Experience). 
 
Our results show that investment banks play an essential role in facilitating cross-border M&A deals. Investment 
banks that are geographically proximate and possess cultural expertise in the target firm’s country can 
significantly reduce the obstacles to the success of a cross-border acquisition. Specifically, we find that 
investment banks headquartered in countries that are geographically closer and culturally more similar to the 
country where the target firm resides significantly increase the probability of completion of the merger while 
decreasing the time required to complete the deal. Expertise in the target country can also accumulate through 
experience. Indeed, we find that banks that have worked as advisors on a larger number of deals in a specific 
country are better equipped to enhance the probability of deal success for a new M&A in that country, 
independent from the characteristics of the acquiring and target firms and its global experience.1 
 
In addition to facilitating the deal completion, the expertise in the target country allows investment banks to 
identify better targets with larger synergy. Firms that complete M&A deals facilitated by banks with significant 
expertise in the target country experience a significantly greater improvement in operating performance in the 
three years after the merger completion. 
 
Our analysis of cumulative adjusted returns (CARs) at the time of the merger announcement show that the 
cultural affinity of the investment bank with the target country has a positive and significant effect on the stock 
market reaction to the announcement. We also find that the expertise of the acquiring firms in the target 
country has a significant effect on the market returns at announcement. 
 
Our test of the relation between acquiring firms’ characteristics and investment banks’ country expertise show 
that the investment bank country expertise variables are related to some of the bidder characteristics that are 
also determinants of the outcome of the M&A deal. We control for possible endogenous matching between the 
acquiring firms and investment banks in two ways. First, we include in all our main multivariate regressions 
investment bank fixed effects. Investment bank fixed effects control for the possibility that banks might advise 
acquirers to target firms in countries in which the banks have expertise. Our results are robust to this inclusion. 
Second, we adopt a two-stage Heckman method similar to Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), whereby in 
the first stage we control for the selection of the investment bank and in the second stage we include the 
inverse Mills ratio to control for selection bias. Our analyses show no evidence of such bias and the main results 
hold. 
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
Investment banks play a crucial role in the selection of takeover targets that can provide the highest synergy and 
net present value for the acquiring firm. Even though earlier research failed to find a strong link between 
advisor’s quality and M&A outcome (e.g., Bowers and Miller 1990; Michel, Shaked, and Lee 1991; Servaes and 
Zenner 1996), more recent studies show a positive and significant relation between the characteristics of the 
investment banks in their M&A advisory role and the outcome of a takeover (e.g., Kale, Kini, and Ryan 2003; Bao 
and Edmans 2012; Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012; Sibilkov and McConnell 2014; Chemmanur, Ertugrul, 
and Krishnan 2014). 
 
Investment banks help in the pre- and postmerger periods. In its 1999 “Unlocking Shareholder Value: The Keys 
to Success” report, KPMG identifies six keys to M&A success. Three hard keys are synergy evaluation, integration 
project planning, and due diligence, and three soft keys are selecting the correct management team, resolving 
cultural issues, and communications. These keys to success are as valid in the post-acquisition period as they are 
during the negotiations stage. Investment banks are an integral part of the process and can competently guide 
the bidder and help critically with due diligence, cultural issues, and communications, especially in a cross-
border context. These aspects of the investment bankers’ advisory role are at the core of our study. 
 
Regardless of the inherent complexity of cross-border mergers, their potential risks and rewards are usually 
higher than for domestic M&As. Acquiring a target firm headquartered in a different country can allow access to 
new untapped lucrative markets but, at the same time, is characterized by higher risk because of a larger 
number of unknown factors. Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) find that companies that are more similar 
culturally are more likely to merge and to generate greater synergy. Although the cultural heterogeneity 
between the managers of the acquirer and target firms is important during the implementation of a cross-
border merger, the expertise of the acquirer-side investment banks in the country of the target is likely to play a 
dominant role in the target selection stage and during the deal negotiation. Rau (2000) documents that top-tier 
investment banks are able to complete more tender offer deals. Similarly, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) show that 
deals involving top-tier acquirer advisers are more likely to be completed and are completed faster than those 
involving lower quality acquirer advisers. Apollon (2014) indicates that higher quality advisers are better 
equipped to handle the multiple levels of influence on negotiators’ behavior. National culture, corporate culture, 
and professional culture also have a great influence on a negotiator’s behavior. Two cultures typically not only 
share similarities, but also many fundamental cross-cultural differences, and therefore, as Apollon states, even 
though negotiators should “weigh culture against other important factors, national culture always remains the 
first and single most influential factor on international business negotiations” (p. 259), and if ignored, cultural 
differences can become a source of conflict at the bargaining stage or later stages. 
 
Because of the complexity associated with a cross-border acquisition, investment banks must play a crucial role 
in the preparation, evaluation, decision-making, and implementation stages of the merger process. Investment 
banks in particular provide significant help during the due diligence, evaluation, and strategic decision stage of 
the acquisition. As Kyvik (2013) points out, the acquirer must verify that the information acquired during the 
initiation of the negotiations provides valid information about the firm’s added value by also evaluating items 
that are not part of the balance sheet, such as national, corporate, and professional cultural differences. As 
such, the investment bankers will bring about several competencies including language skills and knowledge of 
psychology and sensitivity for foreign cultures.2 
 
In this context, we expect, controlling for the prestige and overall experience of the investment banks, that the 
expertise of the investment bank in the target’s country allows it to better choose among suitable targets and to 
efficiently negotiate with the target firm’s executives to increase the likelihood that the merger deal will be 
completed and will be completed more rapidly. We formulate our first and second hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significantly higher likelihood of a cross-border M&A deal being successfully completed when the investment bank that advises the bidding firm has more expertise in the country where the target firm is headquartered. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-border M&A deals are successfully completed in a significantly shorter length of time when the investment bank that advises the bidding firm has more expertise in the country where the target firm is headquartered. 
 
Recent research in U.S. M&A deals has found a strong link between investment bank characteristics and the 
performance of mergers. Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) find that investment bank prestige has a positive and 
significant effect on the performance of acquisitions. Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) show that top-tier 
investment banks significantly help improve the performance of public acquisitions. Bao and Edmans (2011) 
show that investment bank fixed effects are significantly related to the announcement returns of M&A deals. 
Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and Krishnan (2014) focus on investment bankers and find that, even after controlling for 
investment banks’ characteristics, investment banker fixed effects are significantly related to acquisition 
cumulative abnormal returns and postacquisition performance. Huang et al. (2014) find that board directors 
with investment banking experience positively affect the outcome of acquisitions. de Jong, Ongena, and van der 
Poel (2013) suggest that conflicts of interests might arise when the investment bank is geographically diverse 
and might not exert its best effort in a region that bears little weight in its advising portfolio. In contrast, as 
suggested by Sibilkov and McConnell’s (2014) results, an investment bank has a higher incentive to do well in 
these instances as a successful deal will increase the firm’s expertise and improve its chance of being selected 
for future deals in the target country. This is especially true for mid-market investment banks that might enter a 
new market based on the desire of a client and end up creating a new portfolio of clients for a country in which 
it had not completed prior deals. Investment banks can also help identify targets in segmented markets from 
which acquirers can extract positive cross-border effects (Francis, Iftekhar, and Sun 2008). 
 
As a result, we conjecture that the specific expertise of banks in the country of the target firm has a positive and 
significant effect on announcement returns and postmerger performance, after controlling for other investment 
bank and deal characteristics. We state our third and fourth hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The CARs of the bidding firm on the day of the M&A announcement and the day after are significantly higher when the investment bank that advises the bidding firm has more expertise in the country where the target firm is headquartered. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The acquiring firm’s long-term (three-year) operating performance following a successful M&A deal is significantly higher when the investment bank that advises the bidding firm has more expertise in the country where the target firm is headquartered. 
III. Sample Formation and Variables 
Sample Formation 
We retrieve M&A information from the Thomson One Banker (SDC Global Issues) M&Adatabase for deals 
announced between 1994 and 2012 and completed by the end of 2012. We exclude leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, 
recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, partial equity stake purchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, and privatizations, as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government 
agency or in the financial or utilities industry. From this initial sample, we select only cross-border deals for 
which information about the investment banks advising the acquiring firm is available. We also exclude deals 
with privately held acquiring firms. The final M&A sample comprises 7,630 observations. 
 
We collect some data items from Thomson One Banker, including the announcement and completion dates, the 
target’s and acquirer’s names, public status, primary industry measured by the four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code, country of domicile, as well as the acquirer’s advisory firms’ (investment banks’) names, 
countries of domicile, and advisory roles. We collect the deal value in dollar terms when available, the fraction 
of the target firm owned by the acquirer after the acquisition, and other deal characteristics such as the method 
of payment made by the acquirer. 
 
We obtain firm-level information about the acquiring firms from Worldscope. In particular, we collect 
information about firm size (book value of total assets), book leverage (long-term debt divided by total assets), 
and operating profits. 
 
We obtain country-level data from a variety of sources. We obtain the latitude and longitude of capital cities of 
each country from mapsofworld.com and calculate the great circle distance between the capital cities of the two 
countries in kilometers. Specifically, we calculate the distance between cities a and b as arc length as in Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999): 
 dab =  ar cos (deg  )  ×  2π = 360,   (1) 
 
cos(lata) ∗ cos(lona) ∗ cos(lotb) ∗ cos(lonb) + cos(lata) ∗ sin(lona) ∗ cos(latb) ∗ 
sin(lonb) + sin(lata) ∗ sin(latb), (2) 
 
where lat and lon are latitudes and longitudes, and r is the radius of the earth (6,378 kilometers). 
 
As in Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) we measure cultural distance between any pair of countries as the Euclidean 
distance between the traditional versus secular/rational and the survival versus self-expression orientations as 
reported in the Inglehart and Welzel (2010) cultural map shown in Figure I. The graph is based on the 2005–2009 
World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluesurvey.org), which includes about 400,000 respondents from 100 
countries.3,4 
 
We obtain annual gross domestic product (GDP) in U.S. dollars normalized by population, the annual real growth 
rate of GDP, the real effective country exchange rate, the deposit interest rate, and the country aggregated 
market capitalization of listed companies from the World Development Indicators database (World DataBank). 
We retrieve information about the primary language and primary religion of each country from the CIA World 
Factbook database. We collect rule of law for the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and quality of 
corporate disclosure from the World Bank’s Doing Business report. 
 
Variables 
All the dependent variables of this study are proxies for the success of theM&Adeal: (1) an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when the deal is successfully completed (Success), (2) completion time in days from the date of the 
announcement of the M&A attempt to the date on which the acquirer assumes full ownership of the target firm 
(Days to Completion), (3) CARs of the bidding firm around the M&A announcement (CAR), and (4) long-term 
performance postmerger measured as the difference between the industry-median adjusted return on assets 
(ROA) for the three years following the acquisition and the industry-median adjusted return on assets for the 
year before the acquisition (DROA). 
 
The main independent variables of the study are proxies for the bidder-side investment bank expertise in the 
country where the target firm is headquartered. The three proxies are: (1) distance in kilometers between the 
capital of the investment bank headquarters’ country and the capital of the target headquarters’ country (IB Geographical Distance), (2) cultural distance between the investment bank headquarters’ country and the 
target headquarters’ country based on the Inglehart and Welzel (2010) cultural map (IB Cultural Distance), and 
(3) previous experience accumulated by the investment bank in the target country measured as the number of 
deals completed by the investment bank in that country in the previous five years (IB Deal Experience). In the 
computation of IB Deal Experience we take into account the merger history of the investment banks. If bank A 
and bank B merge, we count as part of the experience the sum of deals performed in a country by both bank A 
and bank B over the previous five years.5 
 
The three acquirer-side control variables directly related to our investment bank country expertise main 
variables are: (1) distance between the capital of the acquiring firm headquarters’ country and the capital of the 
target headquarters’ country (Acq. Geographical Distance), (2) cultural distance between the acquiring firm 
headquarters’ country and the target headquarters’ country (Acq. Cultural Distance), (3) previous experience 
accumulated by the acquiring firm in the target country measured as the number of deals completed by the 
acquiring firm in that country in the previous five years (Acq. Deal Experience). 
 
Other control variables include an indicator variable equal to 1 when the target is a privately held firm, acquiring 
firm size, deal value, percentage of cash offered in the deal, number of firms successfully acquired globally by 
the bidder over the previous five years, logarithm of the number of worldwide deals advised by the advisory 
investment banks in the previous five years, and size of the acquirer advisory investment bank syndicate. We 
recognize also the need to control for the different economic and legal environments in the targets’ and 
acquirers’ countries as these aspects play a significant role in increasing the complexity of cross-border deals 
(Moeller and Schlingemann 2005; Cao et al. 2015). To this end, we include in our analysis the difference 
between the bidder and target countries in rule of law, GDP growth, per capita GDP, and stock market 
capitalization. Details on the definitions of these variables can be found in the Appendix. 
IV. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
In this section, we report univariate sample statistics related to M&A deals and investment banks’ country 
expertise. First, we look at the time-series and geographical distribution of the deals in our sample and then turn 
to firm and deal characteristics. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the mergers and acquisition deals in the sample. Panel A shows the 
distribution of the sample M&A deals by year. The first three sample years (1994–1996) have the lowest number 
of deals. The number of deals in 2009 is lower by more than 100 from previous and following years, evidencing a 
significant dip in the number of deals during the Great Recession. The percentage of deals that are successfully 
completed is slightly lower in the second half of our sample. Our multivariate analysis includes year fixed effects 
to control for these temporal variations. 
 
Panels B and C of Table 1 show the sample’s distribution across acquirer and target countries. The United States 
and the United Kingdom are the two countries most represented in our sample both as location of bidding firms 
(33%) and as location of target companies (39%). Not surprisingly, the most commonly paired countries involved 
in a cross-border merger are the United States and the United Kingdom for a total of 837 merger deals, of which 
466 involve a U.K. firm attempting to acquire a U.S. firm and 371 involve a U.S. firm attempting to acquire a U.K. 
firm. The sample retains balance as we have 670 deals in the sample occurring between two countries, neither 
of which is in the top 12 countries by number of deals in the sample. 
 
Although the ratio of acquiring to target firms by country centers around 1 (i.e., a U.S. firm is the bidder 1,665 
times and the target 1,658 times, or a ratio of 1.00), some countries differ from the norm. For example, the 
country with the largest disparity is Japan: our sample includes 398 Japanese acquiring firms but only 65 
Japanese target firms for a ratio of 6.11. The second largest such disparity is Hong Kong with a ratio of 2.29. 
China, Germany, and Austria are at the other end of the range (0.27, 0.59, and 0.62, respectively), showcasing 
that companies in those countries are more likely to be targets in our sample. 
 
Panel C of Table 1 presents similar information to our cross-country matrix but disaggregates the “Others” 
category. In addition, we provide information about investment bank headquarters’ countries. Investment banks 
headquartered in the United States advise bidders for the largest number of sample deals (36.3%). On 
aggregate, investment banks headquartered in Europe advise a comparable number of deals. 
 
Table 2 presents univariate statistics for the deal, target, bidder, and investment bank variables used in the 
analysis. The median deal size in our sample is $116 million. Bidding firms are typically much larger than targets 
as bidding firms’ total assets have a median 8.62 times those of the targets. Deals in our sample have an 89.5% 
chance of completion and the average (median) time to completion is about 3.6 (2.3) months. 
 
When we split the sample between successful and unsuccessful deals, the results for our sample are consistent 
with previous studies on mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2009).We find that smaller 
deals that offer more cash as the method of payment are more likely to be completed. More profitable acquirers 
as measured by better operating performance (higher ROA) are more likely to successfully acquire their targets. 
 
The first result in Panel B of Table 2 shows that bidders are more likely to successfully acquire target firms when 
their respective headquarters’ countries are culturally closer. We also document the acquisition experience of 
the bidding firms in our sample. We use the full sample retrieved from the Thomson One Banker (SDC Global 
Issues) M&A database to develop acquirer merger experience. We create three variables that, respectively, 
capture the global, international, and in-country experience of the bidder. For example, assume Tyco 
International LTD was targeting an acquisition in the United States in 2009. We check Tyco’s experience in the 
prior five years and find that Tyco ran 18 global (domestic and cross-border) deals between 2004 and 2008: 5 
were domestic and 13 were cross-border, 6 of which were in the United States. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the representative bidder firm in our sample on average completed 1.31 deals 
globally over the past five years (0.82 cross-border deal and 0.17 deal in the target country). In other words, the 
likelihood of bidders in our sample being active in an acquisition, either domestic or international, is 49.3%; in 
cross-border acquisitions is 36.7%; and in in-target-country acquisitions is 11.8%. Given the low incidence of 
cross-border activity for each firm, acquirer firms necessitate the help of investment banks that are repeat 
players in the market for corporate control. 
 
Panel C of Table 2 presents univariate results directly related to the main focus of this study, the effect of the 
advisory investment bank expertise on the success of M&A deals. Comparisons between the geographical and 
cultural distances between the investment bank country and the target country, and those between the bidder 
and target countries, demonstrate that bidders are strategic in their investment bank selection. Indeed, whereas 
bidder–target geographical and cultural distances have a median of over 5,800 kilometers and 4.70, 
respectively, the distances between investment bank and target are only 3,626 kilometers and 3.40, implying 
that bidders aim to improve their chances of success through their investment bank choice. Although bidding 
firms have very little experience running acquisitions in the target country, they select investment banks that 
have on average (median) advised 16 (2) deals in the target country over the previous five years. This is 
particularly important as in-country experience is a strong predictor of success as seen in the tests of difference. 
The influence of investment banks is also felt across other dimensions: acquisitions are more likely to be 
successfully completed if the investment banks advising the bidding firms are geographically and culturally 
closer to the target firms. 
 
In Table 3 we segment the observations into investment bank expertise quintiles based on the deal experience 
variable and perform a t-test of the difference of the means and a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney nonparametric test 
on deal characteristics and proxies for the success of the M&A deal between the top and bottom expertise 
quintiles.6 The table shows that investment banks with more in-country experience are more likely to advise the 
acquisition of a geographically distant target (5,841 kilometers vs. 4,586 kilometers for median acquirer_target 
distance).7 More experienced investment banks are also likely to attract deals from larger bidders ($16,607 
million vs. $7,535 million) targeting larger firms ($1,990 million vs. $930 million), resulting in larger deal 
valuation ($1,487 million vs. $281 million). 
 
These univariate tests provide preliminary evidence about the effect of investment bank expertise in the target 
firm country on the success of the cross-border M&A deal. Overall, the results presented in the univariate tables 
are consistent with our hypotheses; however, the evidence is not conclusive because of the lack of controls in 
this setting. 
 
V. Do Acquirer Characteristics Affect the Selection of Investment Banks Based 
on Country Expertise? 
Before analyzing the effect of the country expertise of banks on the outcome of M&A deals, we estimate a test 
aimed at understanding how bidders select advising banks based on their expertise in the target country. This 
test is based on the assumption that bidding firms in most cases hire bank advisors after having decided the 
location of the possible target but not the specific target itself.8 One of the advising roles of investment banks is 
to help in the selection of the best target and to design the financing of the deals after possibly involving other 
syndicate banks. For this reason, we exclude from these regressions variables that are affected by the 
investment banks such as the size of the deal, the percentage of cash used in the deal, and the size of the 
syndicate. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of year fixed effects regressions with the banks’ country expertise variables (i.e., IB Geographical Distance, IB Cultural Distance, and IB Deal Experience) as dependent variables. Across all three 
regressions, acquirer’s size, the difference in disclosure quality between the acquirer’s and the target’s country, 
and the difference between per capita GDP between the acquirer’s and the target’s country are statistically 
significant. Larger acquirers that potential target larger targets are more likely to select banks that are 
geographically and culturally closer to the potential target and that have advised more M&A deals in that 
country in the past. When there is a large difference in disclosure and economic development (measured by the 
per capita GDP difference) between the acquirer’s and the target’s country, firms rely on banks that have 
greater expertise in the target country (less geographical and cultural distance, and greater deal experience). 
 
In the first regression, Acq. Geographical Distance is positive and significant, which indicates that bidders that 
are geographically closer to the target country also select banks that are closer to the target. Similarly, the 
results pertaining to Acq. Cultural Distance in the second regression show that bidders that reside in a country 
that is culturally more similar to the target country select a bank that is more similar culturally. In the IB Deal Experience regression, the coefficient of Acq. Deal Experience is positive and significant, suggesting that 
bidders that previously completed more M&As in the target country select banks that also have advised more 
deals in the target country. This result might also underline a long-lasting relationship by pairs of bidders and 
banks that are likely to have collaborated in several previous deals.9 In the multivariate analysis presented in the 
following section, we include investment bank fixed effects to control for possible endogenous matching 
between bidders and investment banks. As an additional robustness check, we replicate our analysis with a 
Heckman two-stage model.10 Moreover, in our regressions that analyze the effect of the country expertise of 
investment banks on deal outcome, we control for the geographical and cultural distance between the 
acquirer’s and the target’s country, along with the number of deals previously completed by the acquiring firm 
in the target country. 
VI. Main Multivariate Analysis: Effect of Investment Banks’ Country Expertise 
on Deal Outcomes 
We conduct the multivariate analysis by estimating several regression specifications to examine the effect of 
investment bank expertise in the target firm’s country on the probability of success of the deal, the length of 
time to successfully complete the deal, the CAR around the announcement day, and the long-term postmerger 
operating performance. All regressions specifications are fixed effects regressions: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (3) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is one of the proxies for the success of the M&A deal described above, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is one of the investment 
bank country expertise variables, 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is a vector of bidding firm characteristics, 𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is a vector of target and deal 
characteristics, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of bidder and target paired characteristics (e.g., distance between bidder and 
target, difference in rule of law between bidder and target), 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are year fixed effects, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖  are investment bank 
fixed effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
 
In the specifications in which we examine the effect of the geographical distance between the investment bank 
and the target firm on measures of deal success, we control for the geographical distance between bidder and 
target. Similarly, in the specifications in which we examine the effect of the cultural distance between the 
investment bank and the target firm, we control for the cultural distance between bidder and target. Finally, in 
the regressions in which we examine the effect of the experience accumulated in the past by investment banks 
in the target country, we control for the experience of the acquiring firm in the target country. 
 
Effect of Bank Country Expertise on Deal Success 
Table 5 presents the results of year and investment bank fixed effects conditional logit regressions that examine 
the effect of the investment banks’ expertise in the country of the target firm on the probability of successful 
completion of the deal. For these regressions, the sample includes all tentative deals, both those successfully 
completed and those canceled before completion. The IB Geographical Distance and IB Cultural Distance 
variables in the first two specifications are negative and significant at the 10% level. This result shows that even 
after controlling for a wide range of deal, target, bidder, and country paired characteristics, the closer 
geographically or culturally the investment bank firm is to the target country, the higher is the likelihood for the 
deal to be successfully completed. The third specification shows that the experience the investment bank 
accumulated in the past five years through previous deals in the target country significantly increases the 
probability of the success of the deal. The IB Deal Experience variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
These results have also economic significance. If the IB Geographical Distance variable in the first specification 
goes from its 90th percentile of 10,771 kilometers to its 10th percentile of 0 kilometers while all other variables 
remain at the mean, the probability of the M&A deal to be completed successfully increases from 90.7% to 
92.4%.11 Changes of IB Cultural Distance from its 90th to its 10th percentile and of IB Deal Experience from 
its 10th to its 90th percentile increase the probability of deal success from 90.8% to 92.8% and from 90.0% to 
92.1%, respectively. Considering the high unconditional probability of M&A deal success, all three investment 
bank country experience variables have strong economic significance.12 
 
The control variables that are consistently significant across all specifications are the privately held target 
indicator (Private), total value of the deal (Deal), percentage of cash versus stock used to acquire the target 
(%Cash), size of the investment bank syndicate advising the bidding firm (Syndicate Size), and difference 
between the per capita GDP of the countries of the acquirer and target (Per Capita GDP Distance). Consistent 
with previous studies (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2009), targeting privately held firms, smaller firms, and 
using a larger proportion of cash for the acquisition increase the probability of success of theM&Adeal. The 
number of advisory investment banks that are negatively related to the success of a deal might indicate that 
increasing the complexity of the negotiation team does not better resolve the complexity of the deal. 
 
Effect of Bank Country Expertise on Time to Deal Completion 
Table 6 presents the results of year and investment bank fixed effects regressions with the days from the 
announcement date to the deal completion date as the dependent variable. We exclude deals for which the 
time between the reported announcement date and the completion of the deal is less than five days. The 
coefficients of all our country expertise variables in the three specifications are significant and have a sign 
consistent with our hypothesis. When the investment bank advising the bidding firm resides in a country 
geographically or culturally closer to the target firm country, the deal completes more rapidly. The experience 
accumulated by the investment bank from previous deals in the same country also shortens the amount of time 
required to complete the deal. These results are robust to the inclusion of our bidder-, target-, and country-
specific variables. 
 
All three investment bank country experience variables show strong economic significance. While maintaining 
all other variables at their mean value, if IB Geographical Distance or IB Cultural Distance decreases from its 
90th to its 10th percentiles, days required to complete the deal decrease by 6.9 and 13.2 days, respectively. If IB Deal Experience increases from its 10th to its 90th percentile, days to completion decrease by 5.7 days. 
 
The sign and significance of our control variables show that smaller deals paid mostly in cash, involving privately 
held targets and smaller bidding firms with more M&A experience complete in a shorter amount of time. The 
investment bank syndicate size variable is positive and significant in two of the three specifications. Similar to 
what Table 5 suggests, the higher complexity of certain deals that might prolong the negotiations preceding the 
completion of the takeover are likely to be only partially offset by a larger number of advising banks. Another 
possible explanation is that a multiplicity of investment banks with an advisory role might lengthen predeal 
discussions, delaying the completion of the acquisition. Among the country-level variables, the difference in 
disclosure and stock market development between the bidder and target headquarter countries is statistically 
significant in most specifications. The negative sign suggests that if the acquirer is headquartered in a country 
with a more developed stock market and with better disclosure standards than the country of the target, the 
deal completes more rapidly. 
 
Effect of Bank Country Expertise on the Stock Market Reaction at the Announcement of 
the Deal 
Table 7 presents the results of investment bank and year fixed effects regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the CAR of the bidding firm from the day before to the day after the announcement.13 
 
Of the three investment bank country expertise variables, cultural distance is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The market reaction of merger deals for which the advisory investment bank has a cultural affinity to the 
target is significantly larger. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3. The acquirer–target geographical and 
cultural distance coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% level, and the acquirer’s experience in the 
target country is positive and significant at the 5% level. These results provide strong evidence that the country 
expertise of the acquiring firm in the target country has a positive and significant effect in the stock market 
valuation of the deal. The well-documented geographical investor bias (e.g., Huberman 2001; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner 2005) might also contribute to the significance of the acquirer geographical istance coefficient. 
 
The size of the acquirer, the private versus public status of the acquirer, the value of the deal, the percentage of 
cash used to pay for the acquisition, the syndicate size, and the difference in disclosure quality, rule of law, and 
stock market size between the acquirer and target countries are statistically significant across all specifications. 
These results suggest that larger deals completed by smaller firms to acquire private targets with more cash are 
received more positively by investors. The coefficient of the stock market difference variable implies that the 
larger the difference between the stock market size of the acquirer and the target countries, the higher are the 
announcement CARs.14 
 
Effect of Bank Country Expertise on Long-Term Operating Performance Following the 
Acquisition 
Table 8 presents the results of year and investment bank fixed effects regressions that examine the effect of 
bank country expertise on the change in performance of the acquiring firm following the acquisition. We 
measure the median ROA for firms in each two-digit SIC industry in each country and adjust the ROA of the 
acquiring firm by the median country-industry ROA for the same period to obtain the abnormal ROA. To obtain 
the change in abnormal ROA (ΔROA) used as the dependent variable, we first subtract from the firm’s ROA the 
median ROA for firms in the same two-digit SIC industry and country of the acquirer to obtain the abnormal 
ROA, and then we calculate the difference of the median abnormal ROA for the three years following the merger 
and the abnormal ROA for the year before the merger.   IB Geographical Distance, IB Cultural Distance, and IB Deal Experience are significant at the 5%, 10%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, these results show that merger deals facilitated by investment 
banks with more expertise in the country of the target are more successful after the deal implementation and 
contribute significantly to the operating performance of the acquiring firms. Investment banks with more 
country expertise, therefore, are not only able to facilitate the completion of the deal but are also able to help 
the acquiring firms find better targets. 
 
All three investment bank country expertise variables show strong economic significance. While maintaining all 
other variables at their mean values, if IB Geographical Distance or IB Cultural Distance decreases from its 
90th to its 10th percentile, ROA increases 30% and 16% more, respectively. If IB Deal Experience increases from 
its 10th to its 90th percentile, ROA increases 14% more. 
 
The coefficients of the control variables show that acquiring firms are more likely to improve their operating 
performance when they are geographically or culturally closer to the target firm. Larger acquirers buying smaller 
publicly traded targets perform significantly better. 
VII. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks 
As shown in Table 4, the investment bank country expertise variables are related to some of the bidder 
characteristics that are also determinants of the outcome of the M&A deal. The ability of a bidding firm to hire a 
more reputable investment bank might be associated with unobserved firm characteristics that might 
significantly affect the deal outcome independently of the influence of the investment bank and its expertise in 
the target country. We verify that our results are robust to this type of endogeneity concern (self-selection bias) 
by implementing a Heckman two-stage method similar to Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012). In the first 
step reported in Table 9, we estimate a probit regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator equal 
to 1 when the advising investment bank is top tier.15 Similar to Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, the first-stage 
regression includes a scope variable calculated as the number of times the acquirer employed a top-tier 
investment bank for a merger, domestic or cross-border, in the previous five years. In the second-stage equation 
the independent variable is one of our outcome variables (e.g., completion days, event stock market returns, or 
operating performance). 
 
The inverse Mills ratio in the second stage is not significant, suggesting that the unobserved acquirer’s 
characteristics that affect the choice of the investment bank do not significantly affect the success of the deal. 
The coefficients in the second-stage regression are analogous in sign and significance to those presented in the 
main multivariate analysis, confirming that our findings are robust to a possible self-selection bias. For 
illustration purposes, we report the results of the Heckman two-stage analysis for completion days and 
geographic distance in Table 9. The results are similar when using cultural distance or investment bank 
experience. 
 
Financial markets in developing countries are characterized by higher opaqueness and information asymmetry 
than those in developed countries (Morris and Shin 2002; Lang, Lins, and Maffet 2012). The country expertise of 
investment banks might be more valuable when advising deals whose target firms reside in developing 
countries. To test this conjecture, in unreported tests we replicate our multivariate regressions by splitting the 
sample between deals with targets headquartered in developed countries and deals with targets headquartered 
in developing countries. The results do not indicate any noticeable difference. 
 
Investment banks with greater expertise in the target firm’s country might be better equipped to identify 
bargain deals and to allow the bidding firm to pay a lower premium, all else constant. In unreported regressions 
we test this conjecture by analyzing the possible effect of investment bank country expertise on the acquisition 
premium and the CAR of the target firms at the announcement. We estimate these regressions on a subsample 
limited to publicly traded target firms. The coefficients of our country expertise variables are not statistically 
significant.16 
 
To verify that our results are not driven by other country characteristic or industry effects, we replicate our 
multivariate analysis by first substituting the investment bank fixed effects with target country fixed effects and 
then with target firm industry fixed effects (based on two-digit SIC codes). The unreported results are consistent 
with those reported in the main tables. Our main variables maintain the same sign and significance. As shown in 
Table 1, about one-third of our sample consists of U.S. and U.K. firms. We test the robustness of our results to 
the exclusion of these observations by replicating our multivariate tests without M&As involving target firms 
headquartered in the United States and United Kingdom; our results maintain the same sign and significance.17 
 
The shareholder protection guaranteed by the country of the target firms along with its economic development 
affect acquisition outcomes (Bris and Cabolis 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2010). The legal origin of target and 
acquiring firms’ countries might also affect acquisitions. Although we control for rule of law, GDP, and stock 
market development of target and acquiring firm’s countries in the multivariate regression, as an additional 
robustness check, we substitute those variables with the LLSV shareholder protection variable as in Bris and 
Cabolis (2008), a developed versus developing country indicator variable similar to Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 
(2010), and a legal origin indicator variable that equals 1 when the country is a civil law country. All these 
country variables are calculated as the difference between the value for the target country and the value for the 
acquirer country. The results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Despite cross-border mergers’ ever-growing role in the current highly globalized corporate environment, there is 
surprisingly a scarcity of studies about these types of transactions. In this study we contribute to this important 
but underdeveloped field by focusing on the role of investment banks in cross-border acquisition deals. In 
particular, we do not focus on headline overall investment bank volume, but rather we focus on country-specific 
experience. Our study also adds to the emerging literature on the effect of geography and cultural differences 
on financial transactions. 
 
We find that investment banks play an integral role in the development and final outcome of cross-border 
acquisition deals. A judicious choice of an investment bank by the bidding firm can significantly reduce the 
obstacles to the success of a cross-border acquisition because of geographical and cultural differences between 
the countries of the two merging firms. We find that investment banks headquartered in countries that are 
geographically closer and culturally more similar to the country where the target firm resides significantly 
increase the probability of success of the merger while also significantly decreasing the time required to 
complete the deal. Expertise in the target country can also accumulate through experience: we find that 
investment banks that have worked as advisors on a larger number of deals in a specific country increase the 
probability of deal success for a new acquisition in that country, independently from the characteristics of the 
acquiring and target firms and its own global experience. 
 
Investment banks with more expertise in the target country also help their corporate clients identify the most 
suitable targets with greater synergy. The change in operating performance of the acquiring firm during the 
three years following the deal completion is significantly more positive when the deal is advised by an 
investment bank geographically or culturally closer to or with more past experience in the target country. 
Cultural affinity of the bank and bidder in-country experience also significantly contribute positively to the 
announcement market reaction for the acquiring firm. 
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1 Geographical proximity might also provide investment banks with better and more efficient access to soft or 
tacit information. The influence of geography on financial transactions and economic decisions is well 
established in the literature (e.g., Brickley, Linck, and Smith 2003; Loughran and Schultz 2005; Uysal, 
Kedia, and Panchapagesan 2008; Dass and Massa 2011; Arena and Dewally 2012). 
2We note that Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) argue that corporate cultures are influenced by national 
culture, which is another reason we focus on differences in national culture as they speak to the 
traditional impediment researched in M&A research: differences in corporate culture. Giannetti and 
Yafeh (2012) use the contrast of individualistic and egalitarian cultures that select negotiators with 
decision power against hierarchical cultures that might select junior team members without decision 
power for the negotiations. 3The survey data are based on the research on cultural distance presented in 
Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000). 
4We considered other cultural distance metrics but preferred Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010). For example, 
Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions raises two issues. First, its measures are available for fewer countries 
and would have limited and concentrated our sample further. Second, it would have forced us to make 
an arbitrary choice as to which dimensions matter most for M&As. 
5Some of the largest investment banks have branches located in different continents and countries. While there 
are no data available about the specific branch that works on each deal, the calculation of the distance 
between the capitals of the headquarters, if anything, may bias our tests against finding evidence of the 
effect of the country expertise of banks on M&A deals. 
6 In unreported tests available upon request, we perform analogous univariate tests with geographical distance 
and cultural distance instead of deal experience. 
7 All our analyses are performed at the deal level so that in the case of an advisory syndicate with multiple 
investment banks, the experience variables are based on the cumulative experience of all syndicate 
members, and the geographical and cultural distances are based on the average measure for all 
syndicate members. To avoid complication in the exposition, we write our article as if all deals had only 
one advisor. In fact, in our sample, 82% of deals have a single advisor, 15% have dual advisors, and only 
3% have more than two advisors. 
8 In some instances, the investment bank identifies the deal and brings it to the acquirer. 
9 In unreported analyses, we investigate how sticky the relationship between acquirers and investment bankers 
is when acquirers go cross-border. We find that, unlike our prior, it is common for cross-border 
acquirers to switch and hire an investment bank that they have not hired in the past five years to advise 
their cross-border deal. This happens 63% of the time, an indication of the opportunistic nature of the 
cross-border investment bank selection. 
10As shown in the robustness section, the results are consistent with those presented in the main multivariate 
analysis. 
11 Note that if in our sample we have, for instance, a Swiss company that wants to acquire a U.S. company and 
hires a U.S. investment bank, then the IB Geographical Distance variable equals 0, reflecting a distance 
of 0 kilometers. This scenario is 17.65% of our sample. The closest investment bank country to target 
country measure is 63 miles from Slovakia to Austria, followed by Belgium to Netherlands at 193 miles, 
and Hungary to Austria at 231 miles. 
12We tried alternative measures of experience that were dollar based. Our count measure is best suited to test 
our hypothesis because our argument is more closely associated with the process of M&As. Dollar 
measures, though not reported, yield similar results with raw total deal dollar and percentage of total 
past five years’ worth of M&Ain target country activity. de Jong, Ongena, and van der Poel (2013) find 
that international diversification has no effect on deal success rate but their measure is vastly different 
and measures the emphasis of a particular market for the investment bank rather than accumulated 
experience as ours does. 
13We obtain similar results when we estimate regressions with only the adjusted returns for the day of the 
announcement and the day following the announcement. 
14We also calculate residual CARs (CARRES) as in Bao and Edmans (2011). CARRES are the portion of cumulative 
adjusted returns for which the advisory investment bank is responsible. CARRES are calculated as the 
residuals of a regression with CAR as dependent variable and acquirer characteristics (i.e., leverage, 
operating performance market-to-book ratio, and measures of market competition) as independent 
variables. CARRES, therefore, exclude the portion of CAR attributable to the acquirer’s quality or empire 
building, as they are outside a bank’s control. Multivariate regressions with CARRES as the dependent 
variable generate results comparable to the CAR regressions results presented in Table 7. 
15 Similar to Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), we identify the top eight investment banks for value of 
deals advised during the prior five years as top tier.  
16The results of the robustness tests are available upon request. 
17Our results persist also when U.S. and U.K. acquiring firms are excluded from the sample. 
 
  Figure I. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010) Cultural Map. This graph provides the locations of 53 societies on a global cultural map during 
2005–2007. It represents how countries score across the “Traditional Values vs. Secular-Rational Values” dimension and the “Survival 
Values vs. Self-Expression Values” dimension. The oval at the lower right shows the mean size of the standard deviation on each of the 
two dimensions within the 53 societies (the shape is oval because the standard deviation on the horizontal axis is larger than on the 
vertical axis). The graph is based on the 2005_2009 World Values Survey (WVS), which includes about 400,000 respondents from 100 
countries, and was originally published as Figure 1 in Inglehart and Welzel (2010, p. 554). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
